The 2008 global financial crisis spread to most of the developed economies, including those of the European Union. Unfortunately, despite decades of effort to build a Single Financial Market, almost all EU jurisdictions lacked proper crisis resolution mechanisms, especially with respect to the cross-border dimensions of a global crisis. This led to a threat of widespread bank failures in EU countries and near collapse of their financial systems. Today, in the context of the Eurozone financial crisis, the EU is at a critical crossroads. It has to decide whether the road to recovery runs through closer integration of financial policies and of bank supervision and resolution, or whether to take the path of fragmentation with a gradual return to controlled forms of protectionism in the pursuit of narrow national interest, although the latter is bound to endanger the single market. Therefore, the policy dilemmas facing the EU and contemporary institution building within the Eurozone provide an important window into the future of both global and regional financial integration.
I. Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis spread to most of the developed economies, including those of the European Union. Unfortunately, despite decades of effort to build a Single Financial Market, almost all EU jurisdictions lacked proper crisis resolution mechanisms, especially with respect to the cross-border dimensions of a global crisis.
1 This led to a threat of widespread bank failures in EU countries and near collapse of their financial systems. Today, in the context of the Eurozone financial crisis, the EU is at a critical crossroads. It has to decide whether the road to recovery runs through closer integration of financial policies and of bank supervision and resolution, or whether to take the path of fragmentation with a gradual return to controlled forms of protectionism in the pursuit of narrow national interest, although the latter is bound to endanger the single market. Therefore, the policy dilemmas facing the EU and contemporary institution building within the Eurozone provide an important window into the future of both global and regional financial integration.
The complexity of the financial integration process and its significance means that it is impossible to understand contemporary developments within the Eurozone without a discussion of the different forms of integration and of the history of financial integration in Europe. It is important to draw a distinction between economic, monetary and political forms of integration before looking at the specific properties of EU financial integration. Economic integration normally refers to integration of national commercial and economic policies and elimination of trade barriers and of obstacles to foreign direct investment (FDI Wilhelm Röpke was a proponent of the Austrian School, thus he was suspicious of other forms of integration, such as political integration and attendant consolidation of political power. He was one of the first economists to highlight the connection between culture and economic systems and uncharacteristically for a member of the 'Austrian' school he explored the ethical foundations of a market-based social order. His ideas had significant influence over West German post-war economic development.
term protection of EU-wide financial stability in the absence of appropriate institutional arrangements. 9 The so-called financial stability trilemma, 10 which states that the (three) objectives of financial stability, financial integration, and national financial policies cannot be combined at the same time, has precisely described the acute policy tradeoff which holds that one of these objectives has to give in to safeguard the other two. 11 In spite assertions to the contrary, 12 the recent crisis has proven beyond doubt that a common currency area is not viable without building, at the same time, transnational supervisory structures in the field of fiscal monitoring and responsibility and bank supervision.
Arguably, an essential pre-requisite of financial market integration is importation of a harmonized set of core rules, which border on uniformity 13 and are binding in all jurisdictions comprising the single market. Absence of such uniformity can, in theory, seriously hinder market integration as it can give rise to regulatory arbitrage and hidden protectionism and harm efficient group approaches to capital allocation and risk management within cross-border banks. 14 There is no area where divergence of national rules and regulations is more important than cross-border 9 In 2005 Schoenmaker and Oosterloow conducted a statistical study spanning a four-year period (2000-03) on the potential emergence of pan-European banking groups. To this effect they gathered a new data set on cross-border penetration (as a proxy for cross-border externalities) of 30 large EU banking groups. They found a home country bias, but the data indicated that the number of groups having potential to pose significant cross-border externalities within the EU context was not only substantial but also increasing. Policymakers therefore had to face the challenge of designing European structures for financial supervision and stability to deal effectively with these emerging European banking groups. See The fact that political integration in the EU is still nowhere close to what was envisaged by the founding fathers can easily explain the lack of adequate institutions supervising the single financial market and securing financial stability. For example, even one of the EU fundamental freedoms, the free movement of capital, became effective only after the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992, a full 35 years after the Treaty of Rome, as it was essential in building a
European monetary union and national restrictions in the free flow of capital could no longer be retained.
C. The Role of the EU Treaties in European Integration: An Ever Closer Union?
The European economic integration process and the establishment of the Euro as the common currency of (as of today) seventeen EU member states has been incremental with periods of strong progress and of painfully slow growth. In general, it has been the product of political expediencies as much as of economic efficiency rationales and it has witnessed major crises and setbacks. 20 Western European economies have shown in the post-war era a marked preference for exchange rate stability. When the first set of European arrangements aiming at exchange rate 17 From a political economy viewpoint European financial and monetary integration was not just an inter-governmental goal, or merely dictated by the conditions of increasing market integration and capital mobility in the EU. The interests of professional intermediaries may have also been a strong force behind the push for further integration. For example, the Eurobond and the Eurocurrency interbank markets were the markets that emerged as a result of national, legal and regulatory impediments to capital flows. 25 Given an excess supply of petro-dollars in offshore markets, their scale began to rival national markets in banking and securities. This led to protracted negotiations in the early 1990s between industry representatives and regulators that brought off-shore activity back into national markets, while subsuming the many disparate local practices. In fact, the early Eurobond market might have played the role of an imperfect substitute to financial integration, given that capital mobility was only a secondary EU goal until the 1990s. 26 Conversely, The 1966 Segré report was both very cognizant of the growth potential attached to financial integration and of the potential for this objective to be confounded by commercial interests. 
EMU membership criteria and realities
The path to monetary integration that was adopted by the Maastricht Treaty was based on a three-stage process and the fulfilment of convergence criteria. Only countries, which met the appropriate criteria, could gain Eurozone membership. The transitional framework under the treaty provided some flexibility in terms of the time required for the weaker candidate economies to converge with the strongest, especially as regards their macroeconomic outlooks and policies.
However, such convergence proved in many cases no more than drawing board plans. 25 The Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria included two basic conditions for euro membership: firstly, a three percent limit on general government annual deficit and a sixty percent limit on general government gross debt limit. 28 It also included three other important criteria, which were inflation, long-term interest rates, and exchange rate fluctuations. Inflation was to be kept within 1.5 percent margin over that of any of the three EU countries having the lowest inflation rate. Long-term interest rates were to stay within a 2 percent margin over that of the three states with the lowest borrowing rates in the European Union.
As regards exchange-rate fluctuations, there was a requirement of participation for two years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), which provided for a narrow band of exchange-rate fluctuations. The reality was, however, in glaring contrast with the spirit of the Treaty, due to political pressures and the actual condition of the European economies, which even in the 1990s were mildly to grossly indebted states with considerable budget deficits. The
Treaty itself had exceptions to provide political leverage in extending membership to certain countries while restricting it to others. 29 Italy, the third largest economy in continental Europe was running general government gross debt in 1998 at 114.9 percent of GDP (as against 60 percent required by the Treaty), Belgium's gross government debt (home to the EU capital, Brussels) was at 117.4 percent of GDP, and formation of a euro block was implausible without having both of these countries in the Eurozone. This makes visible a huge difference in the conditions of the European economies upon joining the Eurozone. In practice, these differences meant a much lesser degree of economic integration than had been envisaged in the earlier Werner (1970) 29 Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty stated that countries could exceed the 3 percent deficit target if 'the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value' or 'excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value'. Euro area countries could similarly exceed the 60 percent gross debt target provided that 'the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. ' 30 Under the Delors' report, economic union and monetary union form two integral and equally important parts of a single whole and would therefore have to be implemented in parallel (Point 21 of the report) available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/1/monetary_delors.pdf However, the Delors' report adopted a comparatively less centralized approach economic policy than the Werner report. macroeconomic 'initial conditions' of the founding member states made it politically difficult to enforce the strict fiscal criteria laid down for EMU membership.
D. EU harmonisation legislation 1985-2009: Market Impact, Gaps and Loopholes
Completion of the legal and regulatory framework has always been regarded as an essential prerequisite in the EU financial integration process. The first step towards this direction was to develop a harmonized set of minimum regulatory standards based on consensus. 31 This seemed more aligned with the overall objective of achieving a single market without having to endure excessive concessions on idiosyncratic national policy designs and preferences, which might make the harmonisation process politically untenable.
Harmonisation principles
The Delors Commission's 1985 White Paper 32 preceded the enactment of the first amendment to the Treaty of Rome in 30 years, the so-called 'Single European Act'. 33 The White Paper outlined the reforms required in the pre-existing EEC legal framework in order to build a truly single market in the EEC (as it then was) and pave the way to monetary integration. 34 The White Paper noted at the same time that: 'the legislation adopted by the Council and the European Parliament is either too detailed, or insufficiently adapted to local conditions and experience; often in stark contrast to the original proposals.' 35 However, maximum harmonization proved impossible for many areas of activity in the single market and the European Commission adopted instead the principles of mutual recognition, minimum harmonisation, and home country control. The three principles were subsequently enshrined in harmonisation legislation in a number of areas, including financial services. The EU framework for financial services provided minimum standards for the establishment and operation of banks and other financial intermediaries, conduct of public offers on a national and pan-European basis, and extended to accounting, company law, and regulation of institutional investors, in the form of collective investments schemes. It also provided access to the single market unfettered by national borders or restrictions on activity, the so-called single passport facility. 40 Essentially, the purpose of the passport facility was to allow intermediaries to deliver products or services into any part of the internal market and promote cross-border competition. 41 As a result, the 'passport directives' in financial services defined the kind of financial intermediary to which they applied, its activities and the market segment, the conditions for initial and continuing authorizations, the division of regulatory responsibility between the 
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In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the EU has introduced a number of panEuropean bodies with regulatory competences, the most important of which is the development of a common rulebook. 55 The new institutions that the EU has built since 2009 are discussed in the following sections.
III. The Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Debt Crisis
As mentioned earlier, it was not until the 2008 crisis and in earnest after the outbreak of the 
A. Background
Until the onset of the GFC in 2008, the 'common passport facility' was at the heart of the EU single market. The EU legislative framework based on harmonized standards for financial markets sought equivalence among disparate regulatory and legal systems, so that regional initiatives could recognise national legal and regulatory regimes. 56 But a multi-level governance system involves far more complexities than a regime based on minimum harmonisation can foresee. These mainly arise out of the conflicting and sometimes misunderstood national priorities and transnational requirements. Even before the current crisis, the European Union was viewed by some as a 'too intrusive' and 'remote' institution in need of a more coherent set of policies within existing treaties.
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Political considerations also undermined the credibility of rule-based frameworks for coordination of national fiscal policies in the euro area. 58 For example, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was originally designed to safeguard sound public finances and to thwart individual Eurozone members from adopting fiscal policies leading to unsustainable debt levels by enforcing budgetary discipline. Nonetheless, France and Germany, faced with a breach of the 3 percent deficit limit in 2002-04, pushed through a watering down of the SGP rules by March 2005. Arguably, the Maastricht Treaty itself allowed sufficient flexibility to the interpretation of SGP and its enforcement as to allow it to become part of the political bargaining process in the EU at the expense of objective economic criteria. 59 As a result, during the period that the debt crisis was building up, the Eurozone was deeply marked by economic and financial imbalances and the Union itself lacked a central fiscal authority, which would have afforded it a credible mechanism to enforce budget discipline. In addition, trade imbalances due to accelerating competitiveness imbalances and lack of exchange rate flexibility meant that there were no 56 realistic prospects for fiscal convergence. 60 Yet, preserving, in the long-term, any currency union, including the EMU, requires a sufficient level of economic convergence, together with a properly functioning internal market, and an effective system for economic and budgetary policy surveillance and coordination.
Accordingly, when the GFC broke out with force, European financial stability was hampered by a number of pre-existing problems which had simply been ignored for far too long.
These included colossal pre-crisis public and private debt piles, a flawed macroeconomic framework, and absence of institutions capable of handling effectively a cross-border banking crisis. The incomplete institutional design was the true mark of an 'imbalanced' and disjointed monetary union, also characterized by the absence of effective fiscal convergence mechanisms.
Namely, during the first decade of its life, the EMU was premised on a weak institutional framework that was more suitable to a 'fair weather currency', 61 rather than a monetary union with asymmetrical member economies, which were about to experience massive macroeconomic shocks. It assumed that any macroeconomic or banking system stability shocks could be dealt with at the national level without requiring any transfers from the strongest to the weaker members of the Eurozone, due to the no bailout clause in the EMU Treaty.
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Consequently, the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone in 2010 meant that the EU had to enter into the most transformative phase of its history.
While the 2008 crisis intensified reform efforts to a great extent, the true big bang for the mooted pan-European supervisory and bank resolution structures has been the ensuing Eurozone debt crisis, which has shaken to its foundations the banking system of the eurozone. The EU had to devise mechanisms, in the midst of crisis, firstly, to prevent an immediate meltdown of its banking sector and ensuing chain of sovereign bankruptcies and, secondly, to reform its flawed institutions, in order to prevent the Eurozone architecture from collapsing. Namely, Eurozone members had to build both a crisis-fighting capacity and support bailout funding mechanisms.
This has led to the establishment of a European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which will be In the US the response to the crisis was rapid and came in the form of state purchase of distressed bank assets so-called Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP), innovative intervention schemes by the Federal Reserve, and (complex) re-regulation of the financial sector.
In the EU however, the diversity of member state economies and issues arising out of inherent contradictions between national policy priorities meant a much lower degree of responsiveness to the crisis. This became evident as soon as some of the EMU states, which experienced a more severe crisis than other members had to adopt policies based on their own national needs and interests -which may not be necessarily have been in conformity with single market policies.
For example, lack of common deposit insurance in a well-integrated banking market at a time of cross-border crisis led to several conflicting policy choices and responses in an effort by the states to protect their own citizens.
The Icelandic banking crisis
The collapse of the Icelandic banks -Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki 63 -which operated branches in EU member states on the basis of the single passport presents a classic case of home country control failure and of the disastrous consequences of lack of centralized supervision and resolution mechanisms in the EU. The single passport, also afforded to European Economic Area countries (such as Iceland, which is not an EU member), gave Icelandic banks the ability to expand their assets and deposit base through branches and through internet-based operations offering cross-border banking services. As European depositors were lured by the high interest rates offered by Icelandic banks, gradually Icelandic banks built a large depositor base in certain European countries.
However, by 2008 both the country's economy and even more its banks were in serious trouble. While trouble was brewing over several months Icelandic bank operations within the EU were supervised by the home country authorities, which were unwilling to take any radical restructuring or rescue measures, thus, nothing was done to prevent the ensuing panic. So when Icelandic banks faced difficulties in refinancing their short-term debt, a run on the Icelandic bank's deposits in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom became inevitable, as domestic depositors were not covered by the deposit protection scheme of their home countries. While both the Netherlands and the UK, were, in the beginning unwilling to extend protection to Icelandic bank depositors, at the same time, Iceland could provide no comfort to foreign depositors, because it was already in the middle of a deep financial crisis, and its government did not want to pay for the mistakes made by private banks with the assistance of politicians and of 'home' supervisory authorities. Harsh responses followed both from the UK and Netherlands authorities, 64 which, though entirely necessary, annulled the single passport principle. In order to 63 The collapse followed from difficulties in refinancing their short-term debt and a run on deposits in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 64 The UK used provisions in sections 4 and 14 and Schedule 3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Santander. In 2008, Fortis had difficulties realising its plans to strengthen its financial position.
Over the summer of 2008, its share price deteriorated and liquidity became a serious concern.
Insolvency fears saw Fortis' shares to fall to their lowest level in more than a decade and its shares gradually lost more than three-quarters of their value.
Fortis was deemed to be systemically relevant in the three countries. Thus, the ECB and ministers from the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg agreed to put 11.2bn euros ($16.1bn;
£8.9bn) into Fortis to save the bank. As part of the weekend deal to rescue Fortis, the bank would have to sell its stake in the Dutch bank ABN Amro, which it had partially taken over the previous year. The Fortis deal would have seen Belgium contribute 4.7bn euros, the Netherlands 4bn euros and Luxembourg 2.5bn euros. However, European bank shares fell sharply on worries that other banks could have problems, and on concerns over the 700bn dollars bailout plan in the United States (TARP). One of the biggest casualties was Fortis' rival Dexia, which French and
Belgian governments also promised to step in to support. Eventually the joint rescue of Fortis broke down along national lines and each of the three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) concentrated only on the part of the group that was most important for their market, 68 in defiance of single market principles/ideals.
C. The Eurozone Debt Crisis
In Europe, the banking and liquidity crisis soon transformed into a complex and multilayered crisis. As soon as a series of public bailouts took the issue of the continuing solvency of UK, US, 68 (Emphasis added were financed by the surpluses of the northern countries, reflecting, in turn, to massive payment imbalances within the Eurozone (in particular, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland vis-à-vis the European South). As said surpluses had to be re-invested, they found their way to investments in the bonds of deficit countries (Greece, Italy) or to the banking systems of the Eurozone periphery (Ireland, Spain) and financed gigantic real estate bubbles in Ireland and
Spain. Thus, they led to accumulation of unsustainable levels of public or private debt or both.
69
The Eurozone crisis has signaled a fundamental shift in the political dynamics underpinning the EU. While the exact remedies of the crisis, austerity, more integration, mutualization of Eurozone members' debt and other measures remain the topic of heated discussion, one remedy is viewed as uncontroversial. Namely, it is quite beyond dispute that the Eurozone crisis would have been much less severe, if Eurozone members could find a way to break up the link between bank debt and sovereign indebtedness, which, of course, created a vicious circle of ever more bank bailouts and ever-higher levels of national debt. The fact that many EU banks had invested in EU members' bonds and are also adversely affected by the continuous recession ravaging the periphery of the Eurozone has only made things worse.
However, the EMU, although it had interest rate setting competence through the European Central Bank, has until recently been devoid of any binding mechanism to effectively enforce fiscal and banking stability, both areas of serious national interest where pooling of sovereignty was regarded, until recently, as intolerable. Namely, since its establishment the EMU lacked 69 Avgouleas, E. these crucial supporting institutions that could have helped it to restore financial stability during times of acute uncertainty and market volatility. 70 More specifically, the EMU lacked suitable institutions that could absorb liquidity shocks, due to a collapse of confidence in the prospects of a member state's economy, and cross-border supervisory and resolution structures that could effectively deal with the cross-border spillover effects of a bank collapse.
In order to break the vicious circle between bank bailouts and levels of sovereign indebtedness, the Eurozone members have established a funding facility, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which, subject to a strict conditionality, will be employed to directly Banking Union, plausible and necessary as it may be, has also reinforced rather than calmed the centrifugal forces within the EU and has the potential to lead to a serious split of the internal market. 71 Important members of the EU, chiefly the UK, have resolutely remained outside important European Banking Union arrangements. It is, thus, reasonable to infer that political expediency, and not economic necessities, will, in the end seal the fate of the single currency. press-andmedia/cross_border_banking_discussion_paper.pdf. Lamanda's Report had suggested that the supervision of cross-border banks had to be based on three tiers: day-to-day supervision to continue with national supervisors as it requires supervisors to be close to a business; strategic decisions, affecting the entire group to be supervised by colleges of supervisors, with enhanced, legally binding supervisory powers for each cross-border institution; and, a European Banking Authority (EBA), whose independence, governance and mechanisms follow the proposal of the de Larosiere Group. For banks within the Eurozone it is expected that the colleges will become largely redundant once bank supervision is centralized under the Single supervisory Mechanism the first pillar of the European Banking Union to come into effect in 2014. 81 Article 8, defining tasks and powers of the Authority; See also, Article 10-17, ESA founding Regulations.
III. EU Financial Regulation
formal/binding EU law. 83 To safeguard consistent application of harmonized legislation, if the ESAs find a national supervisory authority failing to apply EU law, they have the power to investigate infractions, with the relevant Authority having the power to directly issue recommendations to national supervisors to remedy potential infractions, followed by a formal opinion from the Commission (if the recommendation is not acted upon). If the supervisor does not comply with the Commission's formal opinion, the ESA may then take decisions directly binding on firms or market participants concerned to ensure that they comply with EU law. In adverse situations, ESAs have wider-ranging powers. 84 In a crisis, the ESAs will provide EUwide coordination. 85 If an emergency is declared, the ESAs may make decisions that are binding on national supervisors and on firms. The ESAs will mediate in certain situations where national supervisory authorities disagree. If necessary, they will be able to resolve disputes by making a decision that is binding on both of the parties to ensure compliance with EU law. 86 They have a role in EU supervisory colleges to ensure that they function efficiently and that consistent approaches and practices are followed. 87 The ESAs will conduct regular peer reviews of national supervisory authorities across the EU. 88 They will be able to collect information from national supervisors to allow them to fulfill their role. 89 This information will be used for analyzing market developments, coordinating EU-wide stress tests and the macro prudential analysis undertaken by the ESRB. 90 They also have a remit to consider consumer protection issues. 91 operates solely under the EC law, while the status of the NCBs is governed by both the EC law and national legislation. In addition, no provision was made, until the advent of the EBU, for the ECB to have any regulatory oversight over cross-border banks. The ESFS did not remedy the 'mismatch' between the geographic scope of European bank activities and the regulatory remit of the authorities supervising them. On the contrary, the ESFS might be accused of just providing yet another layer of complexity in the EU structures. Therefore, even after the implementation of the de Larosiere reforms, cross-border supervision and bank resolution at the EU level remained decentralized and in want of further clarifications as to how ESAs would be able to control and manage their complicated tasks when parties involved would include non-EU countries.
Finally, he structures developed under the ESFS for cross-border bank supervision remain complex and involve too many levels of over-lapping competences that may lead to critical delays during a crisis. 106 And then, if any major European bank or a financial institution fails, it would certainly have repercussions outside EU, 107 The EU, as a whole, has embarked on to a number of initiatives to build an integrated surveillance framework with respect to: (1) the implementation of fiscal policies under the Stability and Growth Pact to strengthen economic governance and to ensure budgetary discipline, and, (2) the implementation of structural reforms. As a first step, Eurozone Heads of State adopted the intergovernmental Euro Plus Pact, to strengthen the economic pillar of EMU and achieve a new quality of economic policy coordination, with the objective of improving competitiveness and thereby leading to a higher degree of convergence. As this remains outside the existing institutional framework a constitutional amendment to the EMU will be required to implement it. 115 In addition, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a 'six-pack' set of new legislative acts, aimed at strengthening the Eurozone's economic governance by reduction of deficits through tighter control of national finances. 116 The reforms represented the most comprehensive reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area since the launch of the EMU almost 20 years ago. This legislative package aims at concrete and decisive steps towards ensuring fiscal discipline to stabilize the EU economy and to avert new crisis in future.
Moreover, the EMU is currently in the process of adopting a number of radical institutional reforms with a view of addressing the existential challenges it is facing. Radical measures have been adopted, which aim at stabilizing market conditions and containing the impact of the Eurozone debt crisis on the banking system and vice versa, containing negative feedback loops between banks and sovereigns. 117 Breaking up the vicious circle of bank debt piling up on sovereign debt is a matter of utmost importance for the survival of the Eurozone. EU members need to complete the adjustment of internal and external imbalances, to repair financial sectors and to achieve sustainable public finances. 118 The economic and financial crisis has banking sector may take some time as the EU faces so many existential problems on numerous fronts.
Finally, irrespective of the progress already achieved on the policy side, the experience of the past two years reflects that reversal of sentiment in financial markets and widening of interest rate spreads can happen very rapidly if the implementation of radical measures falters or the measures do not seem radical enough to meet the requisite challenges. The next few paragraphs will provide an analytical account of the reforms that are developed to strengthen the EU's financial and monetary stability with particular focus on the forthcoming Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the mooted pan-European resolution and deposit insurance arrangements.
IV. The European Banking Union
Responding to the ever growing pressure for more bank and sovereign bailouts the European 
A. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)
As mentioned earlier, the EU's reliance on national supervisory structures for the single market proved to be flawed. The failure of the rudimentary crisis management coordination mechanisms that were in place, through the Lamfalussy level 3 committees, lacked both the competence and the resources to cope with a cross-border banking crisis that endangered taxpayers' money. Lack of appropriate co-ordination structures was nowhere more evident than bank recovery and This new system, with the European Central Bank at the core and involving national supervisors, will restore confidence in the supervision of all banks in the euro area…We should make it a top priority to get the European supervisor in place by the start of next year. This will also pave the way for any decisions to use European backstops to recapitalize banks.
Barroso has also explained with authority the main purpose of these arrangements: 'We want to break the vicious link between sovereigns and their banks. In future, bankers' losses should no longer become people's debt, bringing into doubt the financial stability of whole countries.'
The desirable ambit of the ECB's supervisory powers has been the subject of considerable debate. Several member states have wanted the SSM to be restricted to 'systemically important' banks. For example, there is a controversy on whether German savings and cooperative banks should come under the remit of the SSM, as these banks consider themselves as local regional banks with passive assets and low risk exposures hence, subject to different policy regime from commercial banks. However, small or medium-size banks can also endanger the stability of EU financial system as well, e.g., the failures of banks like Northern Rock or the Spanish Caixas. Thus, a single supervisory mechanism is probably a more effective option. Furthermore, the existence of two supervisory mechanisms for banks, operating in the same market, would inevitably create conflicts of jurisdiction and competence ('turf wars') undermining the banking union. Early indications say that the ECB will be empowered to take over the supervision of any bank in the Eurozone if it so decides, in particular if the bank is receiving public support. Namely, the ECB will set the rules and be able to assume directly all relevant supervisory tasks, whenever it considers it appropriate, for each one of these 6,000
Eurozone banks. However, in principle, the ECB will focus its direct supervision only on those banks, which can generate significant prudential risks through their size or risk profile.
Thus, within the unified supervisory system, the ECB have direct responsibility for around 150 banks with assets of more than 30 billion Euros, or those with assets representing more than 20 percent of a Member State's GDP. National supervisors within the same unified supervisory system will primarily supervise the remaining banks. Finally, while the ECB will have the power to step in to assume direct supervision at any moment, if need be, national supervisors will remain in charge of tasks like consumer protection, money laundering and branches of third country banks. ECB supervision will be phased in automatically on 1 July 2013 for the most significant European systemically important banks, and on 1 January 2014 for all other banks.
The ECB will be vested with the necessary investigatory and supervisory powers to perform its task and will apply single rulebook across the single financial market to carry out following functions:
i. Licensing/authorizing credit institutions;
ii.
Monitoring compliance with capital, leverage and liquidity requirements;
iii. single market are mutually reinforcing processes and that the establishment of banking union is inseparable from the completion of substantive regulatory reforms, which are already underway for the single market under the 'single rulebook', the geopolitical reality might be that the EMU and non-EMU members (Member States with a derogation) within the EU are pulling much further apart than ever before. 129 Secondly, there is a legitimate concern that adding supervision -a politically charged task -to the ECB's responsibilities, may compromise its impartiality and independence. Therefore, the supervisory function needs to be kept discrete and independent from the rest of the ECB structures to preserve its institutional autonomy. This is a very important distinction since banking and monetary policy, though inter-linked, are not identical. However, there are contrasting views as regards the extent and form of separation between the two functions.
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B.
The New EU Resolution Framework: Plans for Integrated Resolution Funds and
Deposit Guarantee Schemes
To provide for common mechanisms to resolve banks and guarantee customer deposits, the Commission has proposed instituting a single resolution mechanism, which would govern the resolution of banks and coordinate in particular the application of 'resolution tools' to banks within the EU. The resolution mechanism is aimed at safeguarding the continuity of essential banking operations, to protect depositors, client assets and public funds, and to minimize risks to financial stability. This mechanism would be more efficient than a network of national resolution authorities particularly in the case of cross-border failures, given the need for speed and credibility in addressing the issues in the midst of a crisis. 131 The decisions have to be taken in line with the principles of resolution as set out in the single rulebook consistent with 129 Member States who have not adopted the euro are not members of the international best practices and in full compliance with Union state aid rules, in particular that, shareholders and creditors should bear the cost of resolution before any external funding is granted.
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The main resolution tools, as detailed in the Commission's proposal directive for crisis management and resolution, are the following:
(1) the sale of business tool whereby the authorities would sell all or part of the failing bank to another bank, without the consent of shareholders);
(2) the bridge bank tool, which consists of identifying the good assets or essential functions of the bank and separates them into a new bank (bridge bank). The bridge bank will later be sold to another entity, in order to preserve these essential banking functions or facilitate the continuous access to deposits. The old bank with the bad or non-essential functions would then be liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings; (3) the asset separation tool, whereby the bad assets of the bank are put into an asset management vehicle. This tool relieves the balance sheet of a bank from bad or 'toxic' assets. In order to prevent this tool from being used solely as a state aid measure, the framework prescribes that it may be used only in conjunction with another tool (bridge bank, sale of business or write-down). This ensures that while the bank receives support, it also undergoes restructuring; and, (4) the bail-in tool, whereby the bank would be recapitalized with shareholders wiped out or diluted, and creditors would have their claims reduced or converted to shares. Therefore, an institution for which a private buyer cannot be found, or which cannot split up without destroying franchise value and other intra-firm synergies, could thus continue to provide essential services without the need for bail-out by public funds, and authorities would have time to reorganize it or wind down parts of its business in an orderly manner. To this end, banks would be required to have a minimum percentage of their total liabilities in the shape of instruments eligible for bail-in. If triggered, they would be written down in a pre-defined order in terms of seniority of claims in order for the institution to regain viability. The choice of tools will depend on the specific circumstances of each case and build on options laid out in the resolution plan prepared for the bank. A bank would become subject to resolution when: (a) it has reached a point of distress such that there are no realistic prospects of recovery over an appropriate timeframe, (b) all other intervention measures above have been exhausted, and (c) winding up the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would risk prolonged uncertainty or financial instability. Thus, entry into resolution will always occur at a point close to insolvency.
The Commission has also proposed the harmonization and simplification of protected deposit regimes, faster pay-outs and improved financing of schemes, notably through ex-ante funding of deposit guarantee schemes and a mandatory mutual borrowing facility between the national schemes. Therefore, if a national deposit guarantee scheme finds itself depleted, it can borrow from another national fund. The mutual borrowing facility would be the first step towards a pan-EU deposit guarantee scheme, and would be a natural complement to the establishment of a single supervisory mechanism. The single rulebook could include rules on the structure of the banking sector.
The EBA should develop a single supervisory handbook to complement the single rulebook. In order to avoid any divergence between the Euro Area and the rest of the EU, the single rulebook should be underpinned by uniform supervisory practices. Different supervisory handbooks and supervisory approaches between the Member States participating in the single supervisory mechanism and the other Member States pose a risk of fragmentation of the single market, as banks could exploit the differences to pursue regulatory arbitrage.
C. Evaluation of EU Regulatory Reforms
Weaknesses in the institutional framework have affected EU financial integration in two ways:
firstly, the incomplete or partial harmonization of the pre-crisis supervisory and regulatory framework prevented the benefits of full integration from being reaped and created fragilities in the financial sector to build up in a way that became threatening over time and, secondly, the crisis revealed the vulnerabilities and gaps in the national and EU-wide crisis management frameworks. These weaknesses have resulted in partial disintegration of the internal market and have caused splits along national lines of some segments of the single EU market for capital and financial services. 133 Thus, for the EU, progression to a framework of tighter financial integration and risk controls for the banking system -together with improved governance standards in the monetary and fiscal spheres and centralization of responsibility for financial stability -has become a one-way road.
Current EU reforms promise to create a stronger financial and institutional framework in order to strengthen the resilience of the single market and mitigate the risk of vicious circles of market instability and fragmentation observed during the GFC and the on-going Eurozone debt crisis. 134 Nonetheless, current integration efforts are high risk, as their core only extends to the seventeen EMU members and, thus, it might create irreparable fractures for the internal market that remains incomplete at this stage. 135 Moreover, the new arrangements under the SSM need to become 'first-best' 136 framework in order to stabilize the euro-area sovereign debt crisis and financial instability. Effective supervision, however, will challenge the fiscal sovereignty of Eurozone members, 137 especially, as the SSM will be able to activate the permanent EU rescue fund in order to directly recapitalize struggling Eurozone banks, such as those in Spain. This initiative, which essentially centralizes control over Eurozone finances by reducing the power of national governments, has attracted criticism from different quarters with respect to the role of the ECB, which will end up mustering an enormous amount of power without having a democratic mandate. At the same time, the legal basis for the new arrangements must be robust and must include a mechanism for judicial review, and gives rise to criticism as to whether this is best feasible under Article 127(6) of TFEU or other Treaty provisions.
Finally, the establishment of the SSM is only a big first step on a much longer path towards building crisis management and resolution institutions for the EU banking union. There remain several essential components such as a European banking charter, a fully-fledged single rulebook, a single resolution authority and a common deposit insurance scheme whose detailed arrangements are still to be worked out. 134 
V. Conclusion: Fragmentation or a More Complete Union?
The reform of the EU integration mechanisms in the aftermath of the GFC and in the context of Eurozone debt crisis marks an important milestone in the integration process and regionalism drive, especially because it has exposed the failure of various institutional mechanisms supposed to ensure financial market stability. The EU crisis response bears significant implications in the development and functioning of single market operations and has emphasized the need to improve international and regional coordination on fiscal, monetary and financial policies affecting other states.
Over a period of several decades, the progressive development of an integrated single financial market in the EU combined with a single currency among 17 of its members led to the imbalances that became visible when the GFC erupted in 2008. 138 Unfortunately, despite the vast amount of effort expended in developing both the EU single financial market and EMU, important design features necessary to support financial stability had not been put in place or
were not sufficiently robust, particularly in relation to burden sharing, resolution of cross-border financial institutions, deposit guarantee arrangements, regulation and supervision, and fiscal arrangements and affairs.
It is not controversial, even though it does challenge orthodox thinking, to argue that financial integration is not always beneficial. Despite the increased importance of enhanced regionalism and integration, policy formulation must take a balanced view. The European crisis provides a deep insight to the risks of integration and identifies mistakes not to be repeated in following integration plans elsewhere.
This balanced view of integration offers further perspectives: Firstly, that the soundness and credibility of domestic policies are not substitutes for regional commitments even though, at times when domestic policies are 'stuck', regional commitments can help to 'tie hands' and exert external pressure. Secondly, rather than imposition of strict benchmarks and milestones to meet the idiosyncrasies of individual economies, the integration framework should facilitate and encourage the growth of regional economies while allowing the market to work freely. doesn't matter how much integration or liberalization has been achieved in the region, but what matters is that regional approaches and small steps of cooperation result in increased integration which can bring more growth, development and stability while lowering associated contagiondriven risks.
Risks flowing from cross-border financial crises tend to intensify within integrated markets. The more integrated is a regional market the higher the propensity for cross-border contagion. The cascading effects of the on-going Eurozone crisis are a vivid reminder of the contagion risk in a highly integrated system. 139 The EU crisis is a powerful reassertion of the same reality that reflects on the vulnerability of economically integrated markets in times of crisis when national responses prove insufficient to deal with the common issues in an economically integrated area.
Given this context, the European example constitutes a major significant precedent and as a laboratory of economic, legal, and political integration transcending national borders.
The Eurozone debt crisis has clearly exposed the weaknesses of regulatory structures divided along national lines when these have to deal with integrated cross-border financial markets. It has also highlighted the limited range of policy choices available from within the EU / EMU system as it existed prior to 2008. As a result, the EU faces a number of hard choices extending to the intractable trade off between national sovereignty and collective financial stability. The plans to establish a European banking union within the boundaries of the Eurozone, which will include a single supervisor and, in the future, a single resolution authority and a panEuropean deposit guarantee scheme, have clearly tilted the balance towards further centralization and pooling of sovereignty.
From the EU regulatory reforms discussed above, three initiatives stand out. First, plans to centralize supervision for Eurozone banks through the SSM, which will come into force in 2014. This will mean that the ECB 140 is poised to take over as the prudential supervisor of the Eurozone banking sector. Second, EU plans for the harmonization of member state resolution laws and introduction of integrated resolution structures are in the process of implementation.
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ADB. (July 2012). Asian Economic Integration Monitor: Asian Development Bank. http://www.aric.adb.org/pdf/aeim/AEIM_2012July_FullReport.pdf. 140 It should also be noted that the ECB had never had a 'treaty-based' mandate to act as shock-absorber in the Euro area sovereign debt markets. Absence of this mandate will continue to represent a missing link in the EU reform process.
Third, the development of common EU rulebooks for the single market by the European Supervisory Authorities is proceeding rapidly. Another area of particular importance is the adoption by the EU, through the ESM (and the European Banking Union), of measures, which aim at breaking the link between levels of sovereign indebtedness and bank bail outs. A very important lesson is how the EU has recently apportioned the costs of the Cyprus rescue to private stakeholders, such as shareholders, bondholders and large depositors, treating essentially the latter as investors.
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EU Member States have set up, in the course of the last 60 years, institutions in order to manage the challenges of a multi-faceted integration process and provide acceptable structures for political and democratic accountability. EU institutions have also been used by the Union in order to accumulate knowledge and expertise that may be useful in responding to new challenges. But we should be careful in arguing that the EU institution-building experience, or for that matter the EU integration process, given the specific characteristic of internal market, 142 can be used as the only reform template, although they can indeed provide model lessons to the rest of the world. 143 The impact of institutions dealing with financial markets has mostly been ignored, probably because economists regarded such impact as 'unimportant' 144 in a free market environment. So while the EU is obliged to take drastic steps to cover gigantic gaps in its policy and regulatory framework to prevent irrevocable fractures in financial integration, it still needs to proceed with caution, as all this is untested territory. This caveat puts the usefulness of lessons drawn on EU institution-building experience in the right context. 145 Moreover, it should be noted that the ECB had never had a 'treaty-based' mandate to act as shock-absorber in the Euro area sovereign debt markets. Absence of this mandate will continue to represent a missing link in the 141 For a complete analysis of the Cyprus bailout plan and of its implications see Financial Times, In depth, 'Cyprus bailout', available at http://www.ft.com/in-depth/cyprus-bailout
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For example, the EU has a rather well developed banking sector that eventually became a threat to the fiscal position of certain member states. The size of Eurozone's banking system as a share of overall economy stood at over 300 percent in the pre-crisis period, whereas by a comparison, the banking system forms only 100 percent of the overall economy for the US. This implies that the largest euro area banks are a much larger part of any individual national economy within the EU zone. EU reform process. Finally, the European Banking Union may not be seen as an entirely irreversible development. Taxpayers and governments from both the core and the periphery of the Eurozone may, in the end, decide that the wider and abstract good of further European integration and of the stability of the single market is not worth the loss of sovereignty, and perennial austerity and sacrifice of national interest that they seem to entail. Accordingly, East Asian economies, must find which parts of the European project are successful and suitable to them to adopt and which parts are either of dubious success or would lead to an intolerable loss of sovereignty in a region that is not accustomed to any considerable degree of political integration.
Where, however, the EU experience is invaluable is in supplying policy-makers with irrefutable evidence about the axiom that, although financial markets may be established anywhere, provided that certain property rights are recognized by local law, in the absence of restrictions on cross-border flows, their stability may only be guaranteed through appropriate institutions and not by reliance on market forces' rationality and co-ordination. Therefore, arrangements to safeguard the stability of the cross-border market cannot be delayed until formal integration efforts reach a peak, whether in the form of establishment of a single currency area, or otherwise.
The complexities involved in harmonizing common practices, standards, and specifically the legal rules for such diverse economies mean that European Banking Union type institutions are not feasible in the foreseeable future. Yet this does not mean that the leadership of those countries should not think about the challenges to financial stability created by increasing market integration and financial interconnectedness in the region. It only means that for the time being, other less strongly integrative measures, such as subsidiarisation, are probably more suitable and effective in the East Asian context than the EU's plans for centralization of cross-border bank supervision and resolution. In addition, while establishment of a single regulator with power to intervene and discipline banks is probably not feasible at present, building a macro-supervisory umbrella is essential. In such a case, the function of macro-prudential oversight ought to be discharged by an independent body in order to secure credibility and authority, even if it is a soft law body.
Arguably, in an increasingly globalised world, formal international cooperation in the field of financial stability and cross-border bank supervision and resolution, might in the long run come to be seen as a necessary ingredient of national prosperity in an environment where national financial markets are closely integrated. 146 This would become especially the case if ongoing national and regional reforms prove to be less successful than expected. 147 Building multilevel financial governance in a region as economically and politically integrated as the EU is infinitely less complicated than a similar attempt at the global scale. The same might apply to replication of EU plans in another region. Of course, in the end prove, institution building may prove more a challenge to be overcome rather than an insurmountable stumbling bloc. Either way policy-makers should not assume that they have ample time to deliberate before another major crisis breaks out. They should urgently start with the business of augmenting the global and regional financial stability mechanisms in order to safeguard future economic prosperity and the lessons drawn on the Eurozone crisis may prove very useful in this process. 146 For an example of such a model for the governance of global financial markets see Avgouleas, E (2012). 
